INTRODUCTION
In their quest to become more competitive with other communities, city officials over the past twenty years have shown an increasing interest in local economic development policy and planning. Cities attempt to improve their economic position by competing with other jurisdictions for investment and affluent residents (Goodman, 1 979) . In doing so, cities have adopted widely different development policies: some relentlessly pursue growth; others remain indifferent (see for example Elkin, 1985 and Fainstein and Fainstein, 1983; Peterson, 1981; Stone and Saunders, 1987) . For those cities pursuing growth, local office-holders are most likely to ally on development issues with business interests, those who control the city's economic assets and hence make its economic decisions. This coalition between politicians and business interests is a constant feature of urban politics (see Elkin, 1985 and Mollenkopf, 1983; Peterson, 1981; Stone, 1987) .
In creating this coalition, many cities pursue what has come to be known as the "corporate-center approach" (see Hill, 1986; Feagin, 1986; Robinson, 1989) , which emphasizes growth and real estate development, particularly in central business districts. The goals of this approach are increased economic growth and tax base expansion, with little concern about the distribution of benefits.
The key elements of the "corporate center approach" (see Robinson, 1989:285 286) include:
-the importance of private sector decisions in determining economic development outcomes;
..,
-the public sector's role being limited to the creation of an economic and social environment conducive to increased private investment (e.g. public )l resources are used to fill "the gap between the level of resources JJb investors are willing to devote to projects and the level required for project implementation") (Robinson, 1989: p.286 ).
-attracting advanced services establishments and other growing sectors along with the re-shaping of urban space, especially in the central business district. Hill (1986: p.105 ) has described Detroit's pursuit of the "corporate center strategy":
...Overall investment priorities are to transform this aging industrial city into the modern corporate image [with] an emphasis upon recommercialization rather than reindustrialization, and an orientation toward luxury consumption that is appealing to young corporate managers, educated professionals, convention goers, and the tourist trade.
To pursue such a strategy, planning must be insulated from most neighborhood groups, the poor and minorities. The negotiations that take place between government and business interests are kept from public scrutiny. Unlike Peterson's view that development policy is consensual because growth generates benefits for "the city as a whole," we know that business interests and public preferences may not (and often do not) coincide (see for example Fainstein and Fainstein, 1983) . For instance, spending on development activity may reduce spending on other services; development decisions may impose undue burdens on certain geographical areas and groups; profits remain in the hands of private groups rather than with the public, which captures only a percentage of the benefits.
Therefore in most cities the goals (and planning) of such a strategy are established by quasi-public economic development corporations, which usually do not allow for broad-based participation. These corporations are part of what Stoker (1987) has termed "shadow governments." The use of the public or quasi-public authority, a non-elected development decision-making agency frequently endowed with its own revenue sources, removes development policy from the democratic political process.
As Elkin (1987) concludes, city politics is "a political order with a public and private face," with land use negotiations taking place far from public gaze.
The geographic emphasis in most corporate-center strategies favors central business districts and their surrounding areas. In the process of redeveloping the central business district a new city, albeit smaller and more specialized, was created in the downtown areas of many older urban jurisdictions.
Older cities became "transaction centers, islands of affluence and activity surrounded by decay, unable to provide enough jobs to sustain their surplus population. Public resources flowed to the renewal of downtown areas at the expense of poorer neighborhoods" (Tabb, 1984: 4;  also see Feagin and Smith, 1987; Hill, 1986) . These downtowns became areas for advanced services, high-tech activities and tourism, with luxury consumption in terms of shops, leisure activities and housing.
To finance development in these areas local officials have devised ingenious ways to raise capital, often directing tax revenues towards specified ends rather than the general fund. Municipal governments have set up special assessment and tax districts, whereby a portion of property taxes levied on structures within the area are returned to it. Generally, these funds are used for further capital expenditures, as backing for loans, or to pay for supplemental services. Such mechanisms have the effect of turning over various municipal governmental powers to private business. Most of these subsidies are earmarked for thriving downtown areas (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1983: 20) .
It is the purpose of this paper to describe and analyze strategies used to encourage growth and development in downtown New Orleans between 1975 Orleans between -1985 Leadership in economic development planning in New Orleans has been characterized as following the corporate-center approach (Whelan, 1987 ; also see Whelan and Young, 1989) . New Orleans was chosen because it is an old city with a relatively healthy downtown (one that never experienced the major slumps of many other cities) that underwent a major planned revitalization effort. First, we discuss the context of the redevelopment. Second, we describe the three major elements of the revitalization effort: 1) a growth management program to guide future change, 2) a special taxing district charged with implementation, and 3) an incentive zoning ordinance. Third, we analyze some of the changes that have occurred to four major areas of downtown (Canal Street, Poydras Street, the Warehouse Area and the Riverfront) since the revitalization effort was put into effect. Finally we conclude by discussing some of the post-1985 changes downtown and the renewed planning efforts to stem the decline of recent years.
TH E CONTEXT FOR NEW ORLEANS REDEVELOPMENT, 1975·1985
Between 1975 and 1985 downtown New Orleans experienced its greatest building boom since the city's commercial heyday in the 1850s (see DOD, 1987 Katz, 1983) . The second decision was the defeat in 1969 of the proposed Riverfront Expressway, a six-lane elevated highway along the edge of the Mississippi River in the French Quarter meant to provide better access from the suburbs to the CBD (see Baumbach and Borah, 1981 ) . For the first time in seventy years New Orleanians began focusing on non-maritime uses of the riverfront. The defeat by the preservation community of the expressway meant that the riverfront remained available for redevelopment into tourist facilities, which today are growing rapidly along the riverfront. The defeat also meant that the demands of the preservation community would have to be factored in when planning for the development of downtown New Orleans.
The decisions by the New Orleans public port authority (known locally as the Dock Board) to phase out some of its underutilized and outmoded downtown riverfront wharves and make them available for non-maritime use, as well as the decision by a group of local business leaders to develop a world's fair along the downtown riverfront (using some of the Dock Board's wharves) led to major land use changes along the riverfront, all of them geared to commercialization and appealing to tourists and upscale professionals. Renewal, albeit on a smaller scale, began to be manifested in the city.
Land speculation, inadequate parking and the demolition of many, sometimes architecturally significant, buildings were a few of the problems. Because no controls 8 then existed on the bulk and height of buildings, high rise developments that were beginning to appear lacked quality design standards. The city's tallest building, the 52 story One Shell Square, was built on Poydras Street in 1 972. No consideration was given to pedestrian amenities. Preservationists began to express concern about the changes to the New Orleans skyline, especially as they impacted the neighboring French Quarter. When the 40-story Marriott Hotel was built in 1 972 on the French
Quarter side of Canal Street, it caused a major uproar among preservationists who felt it had a negative visual impact on the Quarter. These concerns led to a coalition of business interests, preservationists and other civic leaders which began meeting on a regular basis. They decided there was a need for a planning mechanism to coordinate activities and to guide and control future growth and development in the CBO (Brown, 1982) . That significant growth was to occur downtown was not debated; by the 1970s CBO growth as a strategy of economic development had been accepted by most civic leaders.
Funding for creation of a program to guide growth and development in the CBD was agreed upon by then Mayor Moon Landrieu (1970 -1 978) and the Chamber of Commerce to be split equally between government and business. The consulting firm of Wallace, McHarg, Roberts and Todd (WMRT) was retained in 1973. After studying New Orleans and the projects already being constructed, the firm concluded that New
Orleans' problem was not how to achieve growth (the problem faced by most old cities)
--growth was coming to New Orleans like an avalanche. The problem for New
Orleans was how to manage growth, and thus the "Growth Management Program" was initiated in 1975 (Moses, 1982) .
MAJOR ELEMENTS OF NEW ORLEANS' REVITALIZATION EFFORT
The Growth Management Program A key feature of the Growth Management Program (GMP) was to focus development in areas where high-intensity land use already existed, rather than allow it to take place on scattered sites where it could provoke resistance from neighborhood groups, especially preservationists. Oowntown's adjacent French Quarter is not only an historic district, but also a neighborhood where many preservationists live. The GMP, then, hoped to accommodate the needs of both the pro-growth coalition and the preservation community. Accordingly, another feature of the GMP was that historic buildings and areas should be preserved. Thus, development should accommodate historic continuity.
Specifically, the GMP established eleven general goals for the New Orleans eBO (see Wallace, McHarg, Roberts and Todd, 1975) . These goals included the following (see Map I) :
1) Strengthen downtown New Orleans as the administrative, office, retail and entertainment center of the Region. Major new development should be concentrated in multi-purpose centers at Poydras Street, the Riverfront, the Superdome Area. All major commercial development should be located in the heart of the e BO (i.e., uptown of Iberville Street).
2) Promote growth while preserving historic continuity. New developments, in areas with historic buildings, should relate architectur,ally to the existing buildings to achieve this goal. When possible, historic buildings should be renovated and put to use. All demolition of such buildings must be halted.
3) "Return to the Riverfront:" Maritime functions along the eBO Riverfront should be phased out as soon as possible to allow new development. Pedestrian use should be encouraged along the Riverfront and developments should not block public access and view.
4)
Provide a full range of activities downtown which attract residents as well as visitors. Focusing on the uptown side of Poydras, these activities might include residential development and smaller retail and service outlets, with an orientation toward the pedestrian.
5)
Achieve an integrated transportation system, balancing automobile facilities with transit and pedestrian uses. Pedestrian amenities and movement corridors (i.e., malls) should be developed. Large parking concentrations should be developed; inter-area transit, such as a shuttle bus, should be promoted between peripheral parking areas and employment centers.
6)
Retain a strong retail core on Canal Street, which should not be undermined by nearby competition. Canal Street and surrounding streets should be landscaped to increase pedestrian traffic vital to retail businesses. Service traffic should be separated from the pedestrian and the automobile.
7)
Strengthen the bond between the CBD and the Vieux Carre. High rise construction should be located away from the Vieux Carre. Major hotel development should not occur within the Quarter, but within walking distance to promote tourist and retail activity.
8 Protect and develop good residential communities within the central area.
Nearby residential neighborhoods, including the Vieux Carre, should be preserved. Residential opportunities should be provided for a full range of income levels and new residential construction should be near high employment centers.
9)
Establish a detoxification and rehabilitation center for the treatment of Skid Row inhabitants and the eventual elimination of Skid Row itself.
10)
Encourage design distinction through zoning and other control devices that insure a high level of urban design, architectural and landscape quality.
11)
Forge a public/private partnership to carry out the GMP and thus institutionalize the process.
To carry out these goals the GMP recommended several tools for implementation. The three major tools include the creation of historic districts to ensure historical continuity and character, major zoning legislation, and the creation of a special tax district to serve as a financing and planning mechanism for the GMP.
The Downtown Development District
The special taxing district was created by the state legislature in 1974 and approved by the city voters in a 1975 referendum. Known as the Downtown Development District (DOD), the tax district is financed by a special property tax levied on all CBD sites. These funds are used only within the district, for programs ranging from supplemental services to capital improvements. The DOD is administered by a nine-member board of commissioners, five nominated by the Chamber of Commerce and four nominated by the public sector --all named by the Mayor and approved by the City Council. Thus in its makeup the board represents a public-private partnership, and personifies the working relationship between the City and the downtown business community.
The DOD provides a forum for ideas and plans on the future of the CBD. It encourages property holders to act on shared interests and to consider how their interests relate to the local and regional economies. It promotes the interests of downtown in the city's planning processes. It has acted as service provider, advocate and planner for growth and development downtown. In addition to development planning it is involved in the execution of specific projects. It has had the financial and staff resources to encourage, direct and monitor development in the 1.5 square miles under its jurisdiction. For the last several years the special taxing district has spent approximately $2 million each year on improvements to the CBD. The funds are generated by a special ad valorem tax on real property in the CBD. Revenues collected through this special tax have risen from $975,000 in 1976 to approximately $3.5 million in 1987.
The Board's primary responsibility is the presentation of an annual plan specifying the public improvements, facilities and services proposed for the District.
The District's plan is reviewed by the City Planning Commission and then submitted to the City Council, where it is adopted, and the tax level established in accordance with projected expenditures.
The only limitation on the projects undertaken by the DDD is that they be "special and in addition to all services, improvements and facilities" that the City already provides. Tax district funds are not meant to be a substitute for city funds, but an addition to regular city expenditures and investments in the CBD. To avoid duplication of administrative efforts and expense all services are to be provided through existing departments and agencies of the City. As services have been reduced citywide, the comparatively high level of services found within the downtown area, due to the additional DDD services provided, has provided a stark contrast with most of the city's neighborhoods. The city's turn towards a tourism-based economy also means that adequate levels of services downtown are critical. Before the City could begin to regulate growth, it had to remove some of the enormous power given to developers through the high floor area ratio's in the CBD.
The reduction of these F.A.R.'s would not have been politically possible had not the Mayor and key business and community leaders stood squarely behind the recommendations of the Growth Management Plan. These political and community leaders had participated throughout the GMP process and were therefore prepared to support the fairly drastic reduction in power to be given to developers and an increase in regulatory powers to be given to the City Planning Commission (Becker, 1984) .
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The incentive zoning program conceived for New Orleans in 1975 was second only to the plan developed for New York City in its encouragement of pedestrian amenities (Becker, 1984) . While allowances were made for some mixed-use buildings to have FARs up to 18, most non-residential buidlings had FARs of no more than 1 0-13.
Mini-parks, gallerias and arcades were strongly encouraged to lessen the density of buildings and open space requirements were strengthened. In the ten years following its inception several notable projects were built downtown incorporating urban amenity elements in return for additional F.A.R.'s. These included the Pan American Life Insurance Building's popular minipark at Poydras and 81. Charles, the mid-block arcade of the Intercontinental Hotel, and the Place 81. Charles shopping mall and food court.
By 1985, the benefit to the public of zoning compromises allowed with incentive zoning was being questioned. Research at the national level revealed that in many instances these pedestrian amenities were not being used by the public due to poor design or limited accessibility (Whyte, 1989) . Without a strong enforcement mechanism for completion of the negotiated amenities, the danger exists that the zoning compromises will not be followed faithfully. In the case of New Orleans, a revised comprehensive zoning ordinance was seen as one means for stronger zoning control (see Greene, 1 984). Plans were begun to initiate a more widespread zoning revision.
Historic Districts Landmarks Commission Among the recommendations of the Growth Management Program was that New
Orleans should preserve and protect the historic architectural character of the many Council over the objection of some property owners, the district along the main shopping street is a rarity among large American cities (National Trust, 1985) .
Early application of the historic district status made possible the renovation of numerous buildings in the Lafayette Square and Warehouse Districts. Investment tax credits were widely used to convert warehouses into offices and residential buildings.
Along Canal Street, construction of the Meridian Hotel was modified to conform with the historic facades adjacent to it. This was a much more successful treatment than the massive Sheraton Hotel facade on canal street approved prior to enactment of the historic district. (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) To have some idea of the growth and development of the CBD in the decade following acceptance of the GMP in 1975, we can look at some of the changes that Smaller retailers relying on the draw of the larger stores were also negatively affected and a number of lower end discount jewelry and electronics stores moved into the area.
MAJOR CHANGES SINCE THE GMP
It was the upper end of Canal adjacent to Claiborne Avenue which experienced the greatest deterioration in the ten-year time span. While Krauss Department Store remained, Texaco moved its headquarters from that end of Canal to Poydras Street.
Many land parcels were used for surface parking and rental car lots. Proximity to a public housing development was said to discourage reinvestment in the area.
Four major hotels are found along Canal: the Marriott which is pre-GMP, the Sheraton, Le Meridien, and the Clarion (which is a renovated hotel that predates the GMP). With the exception of the hotels and Canal Place, zoning has managed to push high-rise developments to Poydras and thus retain the low-scale of Canal Street. High-intensity development was directed to specified areas, leaving other more historic areas free for renovation and reuse. Underutilized areas were brought into commercial activity. Public resources, in terms of federal dollars (especially UDAG and CDSG funds) and DOD/city-financed infrastructure improvements, were used to benefit downtown business interests. The physical and social face of New Orleans changed.
All of this was achieved with a modicum of expressed controversy or protest from neighborhood groups. However, groups in surrounding neighborhoods, especially in the French Quarter and the Lower Garden District, began organizing to forestall the expected negative impacts from a higher-density downtown on the integrity of their residential areas.
1985 was important for another reason, too. It was the first year that impacts of the failing local economy were acutely felt downtown. organization that also runs the zoo uptown. The aquarium was planned to be a major family tourist attraction, but so far most of its visitors have been local (Eggler, 1 991a) .
The siting of the Aquarium on the riverfront at the edge of the French Quarter provoked a storm of protest by preservationists who charged that the increased density of activity spilling over from the aquarium would harm the distinctive character of the Quarter, which is the main reason why tourists come to New Orleans. The preservationists' protests were muted by the official response that the aquarium would mean enhanced economic activity for New Orleans.
The aquarium backers, with support from city officials, have continued to offer plans for much of the remainder of the downtown riverfront (see Whelan and Young, 1 989) . This property is under the jurisdiction of the Port Authority and while most of it is still in maritime use, it is likely to be available for other uses within the next five years. After holding a series of public meetings during the spring of 1990 to gather the views of constituent groups on how the riverfront should be used in coming years and how decisions should be made concerning its use, the Dock Board adopted a policy which stated that riverfront lands would be turned over for other uses only a) after suitable maritime wharves and facilities have been developed elsewhere and b) after a credible community-based master plan has been developed for the use of the riverfront land (Port of New Orleans, 1 990).
The New Orleans Convention Center at 820,000 square feet is now the eight largest in the country and houses major events. A 330,000 square foot expansion of the facility that will double the available exhibition space is expected to be completed early in 1 991. But to keep up with demand a new report says the center will have to be expanded again by 1 996. Where cargo wharves once walled off the riverfront from the public, today the riverfront is being walled off by the mammoth convention center.
Additional riverfront developments during this period included the luxury condominium development One River Place, which brought residential use to the riverfront for the first time, but had to be scaled back a number of times due to the sagging economy, and the Delta Queen Steamboat Terminal, another major tourist attraction. Tieing these and other riverfront projects together is the Riverfront Streetcar
Line which was opened in 1988 in time for the Republican National Convention.
CONCLUSION
In an attempt to better understand the changes that have occurred to the downtown area since 1985, the DDD recently commissioned three studies: The first was the GMP Update, completed in June 1987 . The and still in good structural conditions) could be rehabilitated for upscale condominiums.
Since the ULI study and the Iberville Housing Study were released, calls for the reuse of Iberville have been muted but not gone completely. The DOD has still not addressed adequately the needs of its low-income residents or consumers. The DDD has pledged to get more involved in residential development in the district. To date, most of the housing developed in the CBD has been accomplished without DOD support and residents feel they have been short-changed in favor of business interests.
While attention has been focused on downtown development and business retention efforts, decline has continued in adjacent residential neighborhoods. With little public money available to assist in dealing with this neighborhood decline, non profit groups such as the Preservation Resource Center (PRC) and Trinity Episcopal
Church have initiated programs to improve low-income housing in designated target neighborhoods. The Operation Comeback project of the PRC has as its goal the encouragement moderate income home ownership in a twenty-four block area adjacent to the Warehouse District. During its first year of operation, twenty-one properties were renovated and placed in the hands of first time homeowners (Brooks and Miranne, 1989) . Trinity Church has begun a companion effort to upgrade public scattered site housing in the area. Together these pilot programs are helping to support the community's overall effort to upgrade the housing stock while strengthening the residential neighborhoods of downtown New Orleans.
During the time period under discussion here, it is clear that there has been an enduring coalition between political leaders and business interests geared towards promoting growth in downtown New Orleans. In so doing, the urban space has been reshaped: high-rise office and commercial towers now house national hotel and retail chains and regional headquarters for selected industries. While attempts have been made to maintain historic areas, especially the French Quarter and the Warehouse District, the increasing emphasis on tourist development downtown is presenting major challenges to historic integrity. These challenges are especially apparent along the Riverfront, which has become a prime attraction for tourist facilities, including the Convention Center and the Aquarium. The political leaders' enthusiasm to support the tourism industry downtown has led to more and more decisions about the economic future of New Orleans being made by private developers. As the urban geography of downtown becomes more settled, the public sector's role has become less interventionist, so much so that the present mayor has said that economic development planning (for the city as well as for downtown) should be done outside City Hall (see Whelan and Young, 1989) .
During this period when the face of downtown New Orleans was changing dramatically, the Downtown Development District served well its function of insulating policy and planning decisions for the downtown area from public scrutiny. There has been little debate on what the function and role of the CBD should be in the economic life of the city. Even as resources have become scarcer as the city copes with a major fiscal crisis, little discussion has centered around the fact that the downtown area is getting additional benefits at the expense of surrounding neighborhooods. How tax dollars should be assessed and distributed is not a part of the political debate. The attempts to create a vibrant downtown, relatively successful during the economic boom of the late 1 970s and early 1 980s and quite tenuous during the economic downturn of the mid-to late 1980s, led to a few winners and many losers. The losers included many locally-owned businesses, residents in neighborhoods adjacent to the CBD, workers in the lower-end of the tourist industries, and tax-payers. Clearly downtown development has not resulted in benefits being distributed to a wide variety of economic groups throughout the community. Yet more and more resources continue to be provided to the the CBD as the city attempts to pursue its center city strategy of encouraging tourists and conventions to come to New Orleans and service sector must wonder what this private face of politics will do to the social fabric of New 
